The Gender Wage Gap in the Economics Profession  A Search in the Return to Marriage and Fertility of Ph.D. Economists by Shi, Weiyi
University Avenue Undergraduate Journal of
Economics
Volume 4 | Issue 1 Article 6
2000
The Gender Wage Gap in the Economics
Profession A Search in the Return to Marriage and
Fertility of Ph.D. Economists
Weiyi Shi
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Economics Departments at Illinois Wesleyan University and Illinois State
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in University Avenue Undergraduate Journal of Economics by the editors of the journal. For
more information, please contact sdaviska@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Shi, Weiyi (2000) "The Gender Wage Gap in the Economics Profession A Search in the Return to Marriage and Fertility of
Ph.D. Economists," University Avenue Undergraduate Journal of Economics: Vol. 4: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje/vol4/iss1/6
   
 
 
The Gender Wage Gap in the Economics Profession 
A Search in the Return to Marriage and Fertility of Ph.D. Economists 
 
Weiyi Shi 
Agnes Scott College 
 
December 1, 1999 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
Previous researchers have found that after controlling for various determinants of 
economists’ earnings, there still remains an unexplained residual wage gap across 
genders in the economics profession. This study uses 1990 Census data to examine the 
return to marriage and fertility of male and female Ph.D. economists in an attempt to 
explain in part the residual gender wage gap in the profession. Marital status is found to 
have no impact on male or female economists’ earnings. Fertility does not affect male 
economists' earnings, but is negatively correlated with female economists' earnings. I 
conclude that the different returns to fertility across genders may account for part of the 
residual gender wage gap in the economics profession that is unexplained by previous 
studies. 
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I. Introduction. 
It is well known that there exists a sizable gender wage gap in the economics 
profession. Previous literature has examined various determinants of economists' 
earnings such as prestige of one's graduate institution, volume and quality of one's 
publications, first job placement, etc.  Despite controlling for those factors, there remains 
an unexplained gender wage differential. However, the impact of marriage and family 
lives on male and female economists’ earnings is less explored. Using 1990 Census data, 
this paper examines the returns to marriage and fertility among male and female 
economists and finds that martial status has no impact on male or female economists' 
earnings. Returns to fertility, however, are found to be significantly different across 
genders, and female economists’ earnings are negatively correlated with the number of 
children born to them. Hence, fertility may partially account for the residual earnings gap 
in the economics profession.  
 
II. Review of Literature. 
Previous studies have consistently found that female economists earn less than 
their male counterparts (Johnson and Stafford, 1974, McDowell and Smith, 1992, Broder, 
1993). In a sample of 392 academic economists, Broder (1993) found that the mean 
salary for male economists was $64,288 in 1989 dollars, while the mean salary for their 
female counterparts was only $42,302 in 1989 dollars. This gender wage gap appears to 
have narrowed since 1960s but still remains (Barbezat, 1991).  
In an attempt to explain why such a large gender wage gap exists in the 
profession, researchers have examined whether women are at a disadvantage in various 
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determinants of economists’ earnings. Regardless of gender, studies have uniformly 
found that economists’ earnings are positively correlated with the rank of the Ph.D. 
granting department, volume and quality of publications, age and seniority, and the 
quality of first job placement, ceteris paribus.  The academic labor market appears to 
only allow economists to go to lower ranked institutions after their first jobs (Rutman and 
Stevenson, 1979), suggesting the supreme importance of one’s first job placement. 
As to first job placement, results are mixed. Formby, Gunther, and Sakano (1993) 
find gender makes no significant difference, while McMillen and Singell (1994) conclude 
that women face inferior opportunities because of systematic job mismatch. 
Admission to Ph.D. programs is found to be a fairly equal game for men and 
women in the economics profession. Attiyeh and Attiyeh (1993) find that admission does 
not discriminate against women and instead female applicants actually have a 4 
percentage higher probability of being admitted to an economics Ph.D. program, possibly 
due to affirmative action. Kahn (1995) finds that in 1993 the fraction of doctorate degrees 
awarded to women at top-tier economics departments is the same as at all economics 
departments, implying that women are as likely to have graduated from a top tier 
program as men when entering the job market. “A similar count for 1985 and 1986 also 
found that the percentage female among Ph.D. recipients at the top seven schools was 
within one-half percentage point of the percentage female among all economics Ph.D. 
awarded during those years." (Kahn, 1995)  The above evidence suggests that, at least in 
recent years, Ph.D. granting department rank is not a factor that has suppressed female 
economists' earnings. 
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The volume and quality of publications, however, differ across genders. On 
average, women publish less than men and publish less in esteemed journals, even after 
controlling for experience (Broder, 1993; McDowell and Smith, 1992). The consensus of 
prior research is that publication differentials offer a partial explanation for why women 
earn less than men.  
Finally, age and seniority may play a role in explaining the wage gap.  It was not 
until early 1970s that women increasingly earned doctorate degrees in various disciplines 
(Ferber and Loeb, 1997). In economics, only 6.2% of the Ph.D degrees were granted to 
women in 1970, 15% in 1984/1985 (Broder, 1993), while in 1993 the number surged to 
22.8% (Kahn, 1995). Women are relatively new to the economics profession and hence 
they have less seniority. 
After controlling for Ph.D. granting department rank, publications, first job 
placement, and age and seniority, the gender wage gap in the economics profession still 
cannot be fully explained. The residual signals either discrimination or some uncaptured 
performance-related variable (Kahn, 1995). Discrimination is a popular hypothesis in 
earlier literature. According to a study by Johnson and Stafford (1974) on female faculty 
in the disciplines of economics, sociology, mathematics, biology, and physics in 1974, 
roughly three-fifths of the female wage and promotion disadvantage may be attributed to 
discrimination.  Over time, however, discrimination has become less and less 
pronounced.  The discrimination hypothesis may still hold for older cohorts, but is no 
longer significant for younger cohorts. Using Oaxaca’s methodology, Broder (1993) finds 
no significant gender coefficients consistent with the discrimination hypothesis in a 
sample of assistant economics professors.   
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An obvious deficiency of previous research is the lack of empirical testing of the 
relationship between marriage and fertility variables and economists’ earnings. 
Nevertheless, the importance of marriage and fertility variables is non-negligible in the 
study of the gender wage gap in the profession. Johnson and Stafford (1974), along with 
Gordon and Morton (1974), have offered hypotheses as to why marriage and fertility may 
underlie the persistent gender wage differentials. Johnson and Stafford (1974) recall from 
the life cycle models of training that those who expect disruptions in their labor force 
participation will invest less in human capital, resulting in a lower prospect of earning 
growth. In the case of Ph.D. female economists, who may expect their marriage and 
fertility to affect their labor force participation, their disrupted earning curves are 
reflected in the fact that the gender wage gap first widens and then narrows in one’s life 
cycle. This is referred to as the “catch-up effect” that takes place once female economists 
get beyond child-bearing years.  However, Johnson and Stafford (1974) did not provide 
direct empirical evidence on the relationship between fertility and female economists’ 
earnings. 
Gordon and Morton (1974) argue that women have a steeper labor supply curve 
than men, because they are relatively immobile, given their preference and necessity to 
stay geographically close to their husbands and children. Marriage and fertility, leading to 
a lack of mobility, has suppressed women’s earnings. Reagan (1975) indicated a steeper 
labor supply curve for female economists than for their male counterparts, but offered no 
empirical testing on the association between marriage, fertility, and earnings.  
Partly, the lack of incorporation of marriage and fertility data into empirical 
analysis is due to the absence of family related information in both National Science 
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Foundation Survey of Earned Doctorates and the American Economic Association 
Member Survey, which are two standard data sets used by existing research. A notable 
exception is Kahn (1995), who found that marriage and the presence of children have no 
impact on female economists’ earnings; the same test given to men also generated 
insignificant coefficients.  
Using 1990 Census data, this paper searches for the potential different impact of 
marriage and fertility on earnings across genders, which may, in turn, contribute in part to 
the gender wage gap. Statistically insignificant results, conversely, suggest that marriage 
and fertility do not underlie the wage gap. In the following parts of the paper, I will 
explain some technicalities of the 1990 Census data, interpret descriptive statistics, 
introduce empirical methodologies and report regression results, and then conclude the 
paper by summarizing the limitations of this paper and pointing out directions for further 
research. 
 
III. The Data 
This paper uses the 5% public use microdata samples of the 1990 Census of 
Population and Housing. The data includes variables that comprehensively define a 
person’s characteristics such as type of residence area, education, income, occupation, 
marital status, and other demographic features. The choice of the 1990 Census data set 
distinguishes this paper from the previous literature. Previous studies of academic labor 
markets for economists have traditionally used either NSF Survey of Earned Doctorates 
data or AEA member survey data, neither of which asks family-related questions. In the 
1990 Census, however, detailed marital and fertility information are included for women 
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and marital information for men, which makes it possible to add variables concerning 
marriage and fertility to earning equations.  
Although a measure of men’s fertility is not readily available in the data set, I 
derived fertility information for men by matching husbands and wives within a state 
using household serial number and the family relation variable and then transferring the 
wives’ fertility data to the husbands.  By using this method of derivation, I am making the 
assumption that all children ever born to the wives are also their current husbands’ 
children. Fertility information for single, widowed, and divorced or separated men is still 
unattainable by this method. Given the data set, this is a fairly good approximation to 
men’s true fertility, as married men constitute the majority of male Ph.D. economists.  As 
household serial number is only uniquely valid within a state, I cannot match couples that 
live in different states.  Hence in the following analysis that involves fertility, I have 
excluded the observations of married men for whom I cannot find their matching wives.  
I include only records of Ph.D. economists in my final sample. For an observation 
to qualify as a Ph.D. economist, education attainment must be indicated as “doctorate 
degree;” occupation must be indicated either as “post-secondary economics teacher” or  
“economist.” The final sample consists of 558 Ph.D. economists. 461 are male and 97 are 
female.  
The limitation of the Census data is that it does not include variables that are 
unique and crucial to the analysis of labor markets for economists such as rank of 
department, prestige of the institution, and publications. Additionally, as the public use 
Census data files sample 5% of the U.S. population,  the sample size for Ph.D. 
economists turned out to be small.  
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IV. Descriptive Statistics 
In the sample, male economists are found to earn significantly more on average 
than their female counterparts. The mean wage or salary-based income for men is 
$55,944.35, whereas for women it is $44,527.72, generating a mean wage differential of 
$11,416.63. Table 1 shows that the difference is statistically significant on 5% level, 
according to the Welch’s test for two group means without assuming equal group 
variances. One has to be careful, however, in interpreting this differential, because female 
Ph.D.s are on average younger than their male counterparts and therefore have less 
seniority.  
Men and women also display different distributions of marital status (Table 2). 
Among the 461 men, 379 are married, 35 divorced or separated, 42 single, and 5 
widowed. Among the 97 women, however, 62 are married, 14 divorced or separated, 19 
single, and 2 widowed. It appears that female Ph.D. economists are less likely to be 
married and more likely to be divorced or separated. In comparison to earlier literature in 
the 1970s, this difference persists over time. Strober (1975) found in a sample of 678 
women Ph.D. economists that 26 percent of them are single while12 percent are divorced 
or separated. However in the matching sample for men, only 12 percent are single and 6 
percent divorced or separated.  
Interestingly, wage incomes across marital statuses also display different patterns 
across gender groups (Table 2). I disregard widowed economists in this comparison 
because there are few of them and the determinants of their incomes are rather complex. 
After disregarding widowed women, divorced or separated women earn the highest 
incomes, followed by single women, and finally married women. Divorced women 
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heading the list contradicts the general observation that divorced women tend to belong 
to less privileged groups (Arendell, 1986).  In contrast, disregarding widowed men, 
married men earn the most, followed by divorced or separated men, and then single men.  
This appears to be consistent with the widely accepted observation that men experience a 
marriage premium in labor markets (Korenman and Neumark, 1991). It is notable that 
although single women are on average younger than single men in the sample, they earn 
significantly higher wages. This observation makes one suspect that marriage is 
negatively correlated with female economists’ earnings but positively correlated with 
male economists’ earnings.  
Men and women also differ with respect to fertility.  Among the 78 once or 
currently married women in the sample, 44 percent had yet to have a first birth at a mean 
age of 37.86. About 84 percent have fewer than two children. This appears to be simply a 
more extreme case than Goldin’s (1995) finding that in a cohort of college educated 
white women, 28 percent were childless at ages between 37 and 47 in 1991.  Table 3 
shows that as the number of children increases, the mean income of the group decreases 
rapidly, despite the older mean group age. This observation signals the possibility that 
fertility may be negatively correlated with women economists’ earnings.  Because of the 
limitation of the data, only fertility of married men is available for comparison. Among 
the married men, only 16 percent have no children and 66 percent have at least two 
children. As the number of children increases, men’s incomes first increase and then 
decrease, suggesting a different pattern from that of women. 
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V. Regression Analysis. 
In the final sample for regression, observations for widowed economists are 
excluded because of the multiple and arbitrary determinants of their incomes. Also 
excluded are observations of economists with zero incomes and those married men whose 
matching wives’ records cannot be found. 
To set up the functional form of the earning equations, I consider sex, marital 
status, and fertility, in addition to one’s location of residence, race, citizenship, hours 
worked per week in 1989, sector in which one works, and seniority in the profession.  
Location of residence is taken into consideration because costs of living tend to be higher 
in metropolitan areas and hence the expectation is that residence within metropolitan 
areas is positively correlated with earnings.  I differentiate between Ph.D. economists in 
the academic sector and the non-academic sector with the expectation that non-academic 
economists tend to earn more than their academic counterparts.  Either a positive or a 
negative coefficient can be expected from the number of hours worked per week, since 
one may either argue that lower salary earners have to work harder to advance in their 
careers, or that economists who work more result in higher earnings.  As to seniority, the 
concave-down curve of one’s life-cycle earning is captured by two variables, AGE and 
2AGE .  A positive coefficient is expected from AGE and a negative one from 2AGE .   
Table 4 presents the variables included in the final regression, their definitions, 
and summary statistics.  I use Ordinary Least Square linear regression method to estimate 
the following earning equations:  
Equation (1):   
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Equation (2) includes several interaction terms of sex and marital status, sex and 
fertility, as well as sex and seniority.  A statistically significant coefficient associated 
with the SEX *FERTILITY interaction term will indicate that the correlation between 
fertility and men’s earnings is statistically significantly different from that between 
fertility and women’s earnings.  A positive coefficient indicates that such correlation is 
strengthened in the case of women while a negative coefficient indicates a reduction of 
the correlation. Similar rules of interpretation can be applied to the interaction of sex and 
marital status and the interaction of age and seniority. If one suspects women experience 
lower returns to marriage and fertility than men, then the critical expectations will be that 
the coefficients of both SEX*MARRIED and SEX* FERTILITY are negative. 
Equation (1) is estimated separately for men and women and the results are shown 
in comparison to each other in Table 5.  Equation (2) is estimated for the entire sample. 
These results are presented in Table 6.  
As expected, the estimated coefficients of Equation (1) indicate that number of 
children is negatively correlated with female income, with the result significant at a 5% 
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level.  These results contradict those found by Kahn (1995) that the presence of children 
does not lead women academic economists to publish less or slow their tenure process. 
Results from Equation (1) also indicate that fertility is not statistically significantly 
correlated with male economists’ earnings with a t value of 1.601.  This is consistent with 
Kahn’s (1995) finding that presence of children has no significant association with male 
publication and tenure rates (t=1.75).  The difference between the fertility coefficients for 
men and women signals that there may exist different returns to fertility across gender 
groups. 
The marriage variable is found to have no correlation with either female or male 
economists’ earnings. For women, Kahn (1995) also found that marriage does not have 
significant impact on female economists’ performance. This is consistent with the finding 
in the general population that there is no significant correlation between marriage and 
female labor market productivity (Korenman and Neumark, 1989). For men, 
interestingly, male economists do not experience the male marriage premium that exists 
in the general population. Marriage is of no statistical significance to their earnings. 
Although divorce has not been examined by any of the previous studies on the labor 
market for economists,  my results suggest that divorce has no statistically significant 
impact on either female or male economists’ earnings.  
The coefficients of AGE and AGE2 have their expected signs and are significant at 
1% level for men but are not statistically significant for women.  This result suggests the 
possibility that in the economics profession, men’s earnings rise more rapidly but also 
level off substantially as they become old. Women may take longer to raise their earnings 
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and the leveling-off is also more gradual. This is consistent with the fact that the gender 
wage gap in the profession first widens and later converges (Johnson and Stafford, 1974).  
This convergence is referred to by Johnson and Stafford (1974) as the “catch-up” 
effect women economists experience once they get beyond their child-bearing years. 
Johnson and Stafford (1974) believe that this catch up effect can be captured by the 
negative coefficient of AGESEX ∗ and the positive coefficient of 2AGESEX ∗ .  My 
results for Equation (2), however, do not indicate statistically significant coefficients for 
these two interaction terms. One possible explanation is that women in the late 1980s 
postponed marriage and child-bearing.  If child-bearing is to negatively affect their 
earnings, the effect of a late birth will not be as negative because it could be partly 
remedied by the seniority the older women have already gained.  A late birth also makes 
the “catch-up’ effect less obvious because there will not be much time left for them to 
speed up after a late birth.  Rather than totally contradict the earlier results, my results 
may suggest a social trend of women delaying marriage and births in recent decades, 
especially for highly educated women. 
Complementing Johnson and Stafford’s (1994) indirect and suggestive approach, 
the availability of fertility data allows this study to examine directly the relationship 
between fertility and earnings. In the estimation of Equation (2), there is a negative 
coefficient for the interaction of SEX and FERTILITY that is statistically significant at a 
5% level. This is consistent with the finding in the estimation of Equation (1) that men 
and women have different estimated coefficients for the fertility variable. The negative 
coefficient of the SEX and FERTILITY interaction conclusively indicates that female 
economists experience statistically significantly lower return to fertility.  As a matter of 
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fact, from the estimation of Equation (1) we know this return is negative.  The gender 
difference with regard to fertility offers a partial explanation why gender wage gap 
persists in the economics profession. 
Contrary to our expectation, the interaction of SEX and MARRIED and the 
interaction of SEX and DIVORCED do not generate significant coefficients, suggesting 
that male and female economists do not experience different returns to marriage or 
divorce. Hence, marital status may not account for the residual gender earning gap in the 
economics profession. 
 
VI. Conclusion. 
In an attempt to shed light on the gender wage gap residual in the economics 
profession, this paper examines the returns to marriages and fertility of men and women 
economists. The results suggest that neither marriage nor divorce has a statistically 
significant impact on women or men economists’ earnings. Therefore, marital status does 
not account for the gender wage gap residual that was not explained in the previous 
literature. Fertility, or the number of children, however, is found to have a negative return 
among female economists but does not affect their male counterparts’ earnings. One can 
hence conclude that the different returns to fertility of male and female Ph.D. economists 
may account partly for the residual gender wage gap in the economics profession.  
However, further study is needed. This paper is limited by a small sample size and 
the use of approximate and incomplete data for male economists’ fertility. Additionally, 
because of the restriction of the 1990 Census data, crucial variables such as rank of the 
departments and publications are not included in the analysis.   
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 The ultimate goal of studying residual gender wage gap is to test whether 
discrimination still exists in the profession. Readers should be aware that though fertility 
is found to account for part of the residual wage gap, the part it accounts for is not 
necessarily free of discrimination.  It is possible that child-bearing may exogenously 
reduce women’s productivity, or less productive women to have more kids because of the 
lower opportunity cost, but it is also possible that pregnant women and women with 
children are simply discriminated against. Why residual gender wage gap persists, either 
because of discrimination or other unobserved performance-related variables, remains 
inconclusive. In further research, more sophisticated empirical methods will be needed to 
test the presence of discrimination in the economics profession.  
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Table 1. Two-sample t test with unequal variances     
       
Men: Number of obs = 461 
Women: Number of obs = 97 
 
_________Mean          Std. Err.         t           P>|t|          95% Conf. Interval   
Men         55944.35    1786.457    31.3158   0.0000       52433.72    59454.98 
Women    44527.72    3163.087   14.0773    0.0000       38249.04     50806.4 
Diff         11416.63    3632.705    3.14274    0.0020       4244.016    18589.24  
 
Welch's degrees of freedom: 164.88937 
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Table 2 Women Men 
 number of 
observations 
percentage of 
the total 
 mean 
income  
mean 
age 
number of 
observations 
percentage of 
the total 
 mean 
income  
mean age 
Married 62 64% $40,675.98 40.03 379 82% $   57,830.20 47.22 
Divorced or 
separated 
14 14% $64,447.28 41.57 35 8% $   55,522.11 46.8 
Single 19 20% $44,158.74 34.36 42 9% $   39,820.02 37.76 
Widowed 2 2% $28,000.00 38.5 5 1% $   51,396.80 56.6 
All 97 100% $44,527.70 39.11 461 100% $   55,944.35 46.43 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Married men's fertility (N=369) 
Married/ divorced or separated/ widowed women's 
fertility (N=78) 
Fertility Number of 
observations 
Percentage 
of the total 
Mean 
income 
Mean age Number of 
observations 
Percentage 
of the total 
Mean 
income 
Mean age 
No child 59 16% $49,002.93 45.10 34 44%  $55,378.14 37.86 
One child 66 18% $54,601.43 43.15 12 15%  $53,939.50 38.58 
Two children 142 38% $63,280.34 46.49 20 26%  $31,095.85 42.3 
Three children 65 18% $60,751.75 50.66 3 4%  $30,041.67 44 
More than three 
children 
37 10% $49,900.73 56.59 9 12%  $26,444.45 45.89 
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Table 4.  Summary of variables in the final regression.  
 
  Female economists (N=90)  Male economists (N=409)  
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
INCOME Wages or salary income in 1989 (140001 or 
more=state median of topcode values) 
47368.77 30349.89 2400 195516 60862.5 36097.99 563 195875 
SEX 0=male; 1=female 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
METRO 0=residence not within metropolitan areas; 
1=residence within metropolitan areas. 
0.966667 0.1805111 0 1 0.9633252 0.1881924 0 1 
RACEWHITE 0=non-whites; 1=whites 0.9 0.3016807 0 1 0.8679707 0.3389373 0 1 
AGE age in years 38.7 7.494492 23 58 45.62347 10.0235 21 78 
MARRIED 0=not married; 1=married 0.644444 0.481363 0 1 0.8264059 0.379224 0 1 
DIVORCED 0=not divorced or separated; 1=divorced or 
separated 
0.155556 0.3644639 0 1 0.0806846 0.2726837 0 1 
FERTILITY  0=missing; 1-11=number of children plus one 1.888889 1.275917 1 6 2.418093 1.646078 0 11 
CITIZEN 0=not citizen of the U.S.; 1= U.S. citizen by 
naturalization; 2=Born in the U.S., or Puerto 
Rico, Guam, and outlying areas, or born 
abroad of American parents 
1.655556 0.7214391 0 2 1.567237 0.7707918 0 2 
ACADEMIC 0=Non-academic economist; 1=academic 
economist 
0.188889 0.3936132 0 1 0.1711491 0.3771005 0 1 
WORKHOUR89 usual hours worked per week in 1989 (99=99 
or more usual hours) 
44.12222 10.8419 8 99 45.33496 10.03463 8 99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Table 5. OLS Regression of Equation (1) 
 
 men  women  
Variable Coef. t Coef. t 
METRO 0.4702 2.22 0.1163 0.357 
RACEWHTE 0.0294 0.229 0.2324 1.055 
AGE 0.1669 5.634 0.0925 1.311 
AGE 2  
-0.0018 -6.106 -0.0010 -1.138 
MARRIED 0.9765 0.572 0.2651 1.468 
DIVORCED 0.1968 0.986 0.3190 1.432 
CITIZEN -0.0392 -0.691 -0.0216 -0.237 
ACADEMIC -0.1137 -1.049 -0.2332 -1.546 
FERTILITY 0.5425 1.601 -0.1305 -2.382 
WORKHOUR89 0.1479 3.673 0.0316 5.499 
Constant 6.2468 8.965 6.8297 4.922 
Adjusted R squared 0.1649  0.3200  
N 409  90  
 
 
Table 6. OLS Regression of Equation (2) 
 
Variable Coef. t 
METRO .4041 2.193 
RACEWHITE .0308 .337 
AGE .1643 5.882 
AGE 2  
-.0018 -6.302 
SEX*AGE -.0572 -0.565 
SEX* AGE 2  
.0007 0.532 
MARRIED .0891 0.548 
DIVORCED .1836 0.964 
SEX*MARRIED .0760 0.261 
SEX*DIVORCED .0723 0.202 
FERTILITY .0530 1.640 
SEX*FERTILITY -.1918 -2.371 
CITIZEN -.0379 -0.731 
ACADEMIC -.1431 -1.547 
WORKHOUR89 .0178 5.197 
SEX 1.342 0.682 
Constant 6.128 9.253 
Adjusted R squared .1821  
N 499  
